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RH /Republic of Croatia/ Ministry of Internal Affairs
Mister Šime LUČIN

Z A G R E B

**Subject: Overview of the information obtained by the RH MUP, about events
concerning crimes committed in Ahmići**

Enclosed to the official letter, we submit "Overview of the information obtained by
the RH MUP, about the events concerning crimes committed in Ahmići with a
proposal for further procedure".

Enclosure: 1

Assistant Minister

Assistant Minister

Dragutin CESTAR

Mr.Sc. Franjo TUREK

/signed/

/signed/

English Translation

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/Stamped. Stamp, reading: "Republic of Croatia; Ministry of Internal Affairs; Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order"/

Written in 7 copies:

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- Head of the RH UNS /National Security Office/, Prof. T. KARAMARKO
- Head of HIS /Croatian Information Service/, Mr. D. LONČARIĆ
- RH Assistant Minister of Defence, Mr. M. RUŽMAN
- Head of the Office for Cooperation with the International Court of Justice and International Tribunal in the Hague, Mr. Sc. O. MILJENIĆ

English Translation

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STATE SECRET

OVERVIEW

OF INFORMATION OBTAINED BY THE RH MUP ABOUT EVENTS
CONCERNING CRIMES COMMITTED IN AHMIĆI, WITH A PROPOSAL
FOR FURTHER ACTION

Zagreb, 21 August 2000

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1. INTRODUCTION

General remarks

This document represents an attempt to bring together all the data and facts, which are gathered by these two MUP police services, as well as measures and actions taken by the SZUP and crime police since March 2000 in connection with the crime in Ahmići village (April 1993). It illustrates the causes of the Croatian-Muslim conflict in BiH and the Lašva Valley, the structure of civilian and military authorities in Central Bosnia, the circumstances of the crime in Ahmići, its perpetrators and persons responsible, the role and conduct of persons and services responsible in what was then the HR /Croatian Republic/ HB /Herceg Bosnia/ after the crime, the activities and influence of state structures in the service of the OZ /Operations Zone/ RH and other individuals from RH in shedding light on or concealing facts and evidence in connection with Ahmići and the trial of General Tihomir BLAŠKIĆ before the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, and the giving of false identities to the perpetrators of the crime, as well as measures that were taken by MUP in order to find those perpetrators.

This document tries to suggest general priorities for further work of the MUP's police services, and other Republic of Croatia intelligence services, as well as specific measures and actions taken against certain persons that were mentioned in the document, in order to define facts and to gather evidence relevant for General BLAŠKIĆ's trial and arrest and trial of the perpetrators who directly committed crimes in Ahmići, as well as defining the possible responsibility of certain individuals for hiding the persons who committed crimes or evidence relevant for the Ahmići case.

In order to review and evaluate the content of documents more objectively, we consider it necessary to outline some facts that determined, that is, put limits on the MUP's procedures in this case. Those facts could also influence completeness, that is, the accuracy of data presented in this overview:

1. The SZUP and the Department of Criminal Police got a mandate for the opening of an operative and criminal proceeding for this case only at the end of March this year.
2. The facts that are presented in this official letter are only the result of the MUP's investigation, that is, they were acquired solely through contacts with a certain number of operative sources, as well as through interviews with certain individuals that have been conducted since the end of March this year, and also from access to the MUP's existing documentation which was very insufficient because of reasons that will be discussed in the text below. While creating this document, the MUP did not have available relevant documentation which was collected in years past by other RH intelligence services (above all the HIS and SIS).
3. The persons who are the sources of this information, have various points of view that influence the reliability of their statements and make them inconclusive and contradictory:
 - a) Time that passed since the events in question.
 - b) Fear of prosecution (by the ICTY or Croatian justice system), whether because of participation in the crime committed in Ahmići, or because of hiding perpetrators or evidence in BiH; fear of retaliation from the persons who committed crimes or of pressure groups that are hiding them, etc.
 - c) Professional solidarity (with the members of the BiH and RH intelligence services that are involved in the events in relation to Ahmići), connections with the "intelligence underground" in BiH and RH, connections with political mentors in BiH and RH, etc.

The MUP's treatment of the Ahmići "case" until 2000.

As it was stated in the previous text, the Criminal Police Department of the MUP and the SZUP did not have a mandate to undertake investigations in cases that were directly or indirectly connected with Ahmići until March 2000.

This sort of situation had its foundation in the law (and also in the division of jurisdiction within the RH intelligence community), because both police services (especially the Criminal Police), each within their own sphere, have jurisdiction only over RH territory.

On the other hand, it is clear that it suited vested interest groups in the RH's state leadership and within the leadership of the RH intelligence community that created and conducted certain policies toward BiH, and contacted appropriate vested interest groups in the so called HZ H-B, that the two actually strongest (in terms of personnel, technical potential, legal authorization and due process of law) police and security services in RH, actually stay "beyond events". Thus, they had a much easier time of manipulating the truth in regards to Ahmići, as well as in regards to the broader situation in BiH.

In regards to the SZUP, it should be pointed out that the service has been establishing operative facts on regular basis since 1990. Those facts were connected with crimes that were committed in the RH by the individuals on the Croatian side, so that the instructions that are in connection to that, were directed from the headquarters in Zagreb to the SZUP centres.

Because of such activities, the service was exposed to pressures on a regular basis, as well as to immediate threats not only on the ground, but also at higher political levels. In this regard, the SZUP did not have any mandate to directly prosecute the perpetrators, but the important documentation and data were ceded to other government organs.

When the HIS was founded in 1993, the SZUP lost its mandate to act beyond the borders of the RH, and that is why operations in BiH and SRJ /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ were not carried out anymore and most of the existing cooperative network should have been handed over to the HIS. In that context, the SZUP did not have, nor has, information (trial documentation, etc.) that would be of any importance

to the trial of General BLAŠKIĆ and other persons from BiH, whose cases are at the moment before the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague.

Since the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague, all actions taken by the RH intelligence community were planned and coordinated by the HIS, and mainly carried out by the MORH /Republic of Croatia Ministry of Defence/ SIS. All documentation and information that the SZUP would obtain from time to time would be submitted to the HIS. SZUP activity mainly consisted of operative and technical support within RH borders.

In that way, the SZUP participated in OA "Haag", /part of the line redacted/, which was evidenced and coordinated by the HIS.

OA "Haag" was formally initiated by the HIS, and the tasks of the action, which were primarily linked to the defence of the accused Croats, were directly carried out by the operative group "Haag", i.e. the MORH SIS.

Tasks and activities within the mentioned operative action mainly consisted of:

- monitoring (operative and operative-technical) of the activities of the Office of the ICTY in Zagreb;
- establishing the identity of The Hague's investigators and monitoring of contacts they make with citizens of the RH;
- operative checks of persons, RH citizens that work for the Tribunal;
- performing of operative checks for persons engaged in the defence of the indicted persons;
- monitoring of activities performed by certain RH citizens who were collecting evidence and documentation in order to deliver them to the Hague Tribunal;
- collecting and analyzing comments made by the officials of the Tribunal, foreign DK /sic, probably diplomatic and consular/ representatives and other relevant external factors, concerning the level of relationships and cooperation of the RH with the Tribunal, and concerning the influence of those relations on the international position of the RH;
- conducting interviews with the RH citizens and foreigners in RH who could have relevant information that would be useful for the defence of the Croats

indicted in The Hague (the SZUP did not come upon more relevant documents here), etc;

- at the SIS' request and with the HIS's knowledge, the SZUP made a Croatian passport for /part of the line redacted/, whom Anto NOBILO intended to use as a defence witness for BLAŠKIĆ. At the same time, upon the request (written suggestion) of the SIS, the SZUP in Zadar applied TKTR /electronic surveillance / over /part of the line redacted/ and submitted the results to the SIS;

- The SZUP (Split Centre) on the orders of former Minister Ivan JARNJAK, arrested Zlatko ALEKSOVSKI, who was residing in Baško Polje near Makarska, with /his/ security provided by the SIS. He was arrested "by deceit" and handed over to the Croatian judiciary without the knowledge of the SIS, which speaks for itself about lack of unity in Croatian politics in relation to cooperation with The Hague Tribunal.

Consistent with the above mentioned activities, there is documentation that is at the SZUP's disposal about this action, and all relevant documents were submitted to the HIS.

/Part of the line redacted/ was the HIS's operation that specifically referred to the arrest of Mladen NALETILIĆ aka Tuta and for his trial in Zagreb.

The goal of the HIS's operation /part of the line redacted/ is to document crimes committed by the Muslims and the Serbs over the Croats in BiH. Within this action, the SZUP conducted interviews with Croats who were expelled from BiH and who are currently residing on the territory of the RH. According to our evaluation, we did not succeed in obtaining relevant information about this OA /Operative Action/, and all available information was forwarded to the HIS. According to the information that is currently at the SZUP's disposal, there were only direct requests for the SZUP and these were made by the International Criminal Tribunal, that is, direct contacts of SZUP's employees with the representatives of The Hague's Tribunal in 1996 and 1997. In that case, the SZUP acted within its domain and legal authorization, and activities did not refer to events connected to Ahmići.

We wish to point out that the information presented is initial and of an operative character, and in order to facilitate a more objective perusal and assessment of the content of the document it should be stressed that the information stated herein is neither complete nor verified in detail since it is of an operative nature, and that in the forthcoming period efforts will be made to have it rendered more exact and to have it verified.

2. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN BIH WITH REFERENCE TO AHMIĆI

a) causes of the Croatian-Muslim conflict in BiH and the Lasva Valley

After its withdrawal from Slovenia and RH and its transferral to BiH, the JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ placed itself fully at the disposal of the Serbian population there, which was a clear sign that armed conflict would break out in BiH and that the Croatian population in BiH would find itself in a particularly difficult position. The leadership of Herceg-Bosna adopted a decision to form so-called crisis staffs in areas of BiH where Croatian populations were living. The staffs were formed on a regional basis, but were not linked with each other and lacked coordination and general structure. There exists a written decision of the leadership of the HDZ /Croatian Democratic Union/ for BiH on the establishment of crisis staffs, which was signed by **Stjepan KLJUJIĆ**.

At the start of 1992 a crisis staff was established, which covered the towns of Novi Travnik, Travnik, Kiseljak, Vitez, Busovača, Žepče, Nova Bila and Vareš. In that area the executors of political and civilian authority were **Ignac KOŠTROMAN** and **Dario KORDIĆ**. At that time cooperation with the Muslims in Central Bosnia still existed. Stjepan KLJUJIĆ collaborated with **Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ** with the aim of organising a combined defence against the Greater Serbian aggression. There were

also options to attempt to integrate JNA forces from those areas into the crisis staffs so that qualified personnel and weapons could be obtained.

Parallel to the establishment of the crisis staffs, the Muslims, probably according to a political decision of the SDA /Party of Democratic Action/, established the so-called Territorial Defence /TO/, which was formed exclusively from the Muslim population. Those formations were the descendants of the JNA territorial system in BiH. The SDA reportedly issued a political decision that the forces of the JNA and the TO should be united. Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ and the SDA leadership were collaborating very closely with the JNA at that time and they adopted a political decision to keep the whole of BiH within the framework of Yugoslavia. These decisions by the SDA and TO were completely unacceptable for the Croatian people because it was clear to all that in this case there would be no trace of any Yugoslavia, rather it would be a "Greater Serbia".

From the outbreak of hostilities until the end of 1992, Serbian forces in BiH succeeded in reaching most of their military objectives, having occupied two thirds of territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and having driven back the HV and BiH Army into western and central Herzegovina, Central Bosnia, Mostar, and the Zenica and Tuzla area. A large number of Muslim and Croatian units and several hundred thousand refugees (mostly Muslim, as the majority of Croatian refugees had found refuge in RH) found themselves in a comparatively small area of free territory, and relations between the Croatian and Muslim political and military leadership were increasingly eroded as a result of conflicts over the organisation of civilian and military authorities, combined military tactics and strategy, the attitude towards RH, the sharing of weapons captured or procured abroad, the ever-increasing number of Islamic volunteers (mujahedin) serving in the BiH Army and so forth. The conflict intensified after a secret meeting between **Mate BOBAN** and **Radovan KARADŽIĆ** in Graz, when the "Croatian" policy in BiH up to that time was entirely changed, with the position being adopted in the top echelons of the HDZ of BiH that the Serbs were not the main enemy, but rather preparations should be made for war against the Muslims.

This position was also adopted by most of the Croatian military and political leadership in Central Bosnia, where tensions were rising with the Muslims by the

summer of 1992. Conflicts escalated with the reinforcement of BiH Army units stationed there (and some of the Muslim leadership there took a radical stance concerning attitude towards the HVO and the Croatian population in general). The "new" military and political stance, which was in line with the agreement with the Serbs, was also supported by General **BLAŠKIĆ**, at that time the commander of the HVO Vitez – Busovača Military District, who took military forces from the front against the Serbs and redeployed them to face the Muslim forces.

Before the end of 1992, as a result of these clashes of political stances, the HR of Herceg-Bosnia was established. (sic.) The HVO was also established at the same time. Following the political decision of the leadership of the HR HB /Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosnia/, both political and military components were integrated into the HVO. Then the political leaders of local areas were automatically appointed military officials, and thus Dario **KORDIĆ** came to be appointed a major.

In the fighting that broke out across Central Bosnia in the spring of 1993 between the Croats and Muslims, the BiH Army defeated the HVO forces in the area of Zeniča, Kakanj, Travnik, Visoko, Vareš and so forth, and the Croatian units and population were left concentrated in the relatively narrow area of Novi Travnik, Vitez and Busovača, which had no direct link with the rest of the territory in BiH under HVO control. Immediately before the events in Ahmići, the territory under the control of Croatian forces in Central Bosnia was close to falling.

Hostilities particularly intensified after Muslim forces cut off the Vitez-Busovača road. The objective of this military operation by the Muslims was to take Vitez. In Vitez, there was an explosives and ammunition factory, which was of particular strategic importance. After hostilities intensified the HVO suffered great losses, and it was also short of weapons, ammunition and medical supplies as it was completely surrounded. The situation became very serious and it was only a matter of days before the Muslim forces would break through the defence lines and take military control of the area. At that time **KOSTROMAN**, Dario **KORDIĆ** and Tihomir **BLAŠKIĆ**, as the HVO leaders, desperately sought help from Mostar and Croatia.

In January 1993, "special purpose units" arrived in the area: the Convicts' Battalion and the *Bruno Bušić* Special Unit. They committed violence against the population and provoked fighting with the Muslims. Source/?s/ believe that this was a planned prelude to a future full-scale open conflict with the Muslims in BiH.

**b) THE STRUCTURE OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES
IN CENTRAL BOSNIA AND THE DISPOSITION OF MILITARY
FORMATIONS AT THE TIME OF AHMIĆI**

The Central Bosnia Operative Zone (later Vitez – Busovača Military District), was established on the territory under Croatian control. It was made up of a few brigades and various local units, which were badly organised and lacked a firmly defined system of command. The military formations were mostly manned by volunteers, and not infrequently there were also persons from the criminal world among them, which had a particular bearing on the subsequently established military police.

The commander of the Central Bosnia Operative Zone was General **BLAŠKIĆ**, who was personally appointed to this post by **Mate BOBAN** at the start of 1993. **BLAŠKIĆ**'s basic task was to coordinate the HVO military formations. Immediately after taking up his duties, **BLAŠKIĆ** made attempts to organize HVO formations according to the principles of military doctrine.

BLAŠKIĆ demanded strict discipline and soldierly conduct from the local commanders. Such decisions did not please local commanders and they fiercely resisted all of **BLAŠKIĆ**'s orders and as a rule did not implement them on the ground. In addition to this, at that time great influence was already held by **Dario KORDIĆ**, the then HVO Assistant Chief of Staff, and **Ignac KOŠTROMAN**, the Chief of the HVO Political Administration, both of whom were also senior officials of the HDZ of BiH. Furthermore, before the events in Ahmići, at a meeting with the then Chief of the HVO Main Staff, **Milivoj PETKOVIĆ**, an order was issued whereby assistant chiefs of the HVO GS /Main Staff/, when in the field, were given a command function in relation to the commander of a military district (this also related to the military district under T. **BLAŠKIĆ**'s authority).

At that time **Paško LJUBIČIĆ** was the commander of the HVO 4th Military Police Battalion, which was involved in all the major clashes with the Muslims in the area of Vitez, Novi Travnik and Busovača. His deputy was **Vlado ĆOSIĆ**.

All the above persons enjoyed relative independence vis-à-vis **BLAŠKIĆ** in leading their units and planning and conducting operations. In addition, **KORDIĆ** and **KOŠTROMAN** were much more influential politically than **BLAŠKIĆ**, and some commanders in the field who were directly connected to the two of them could carry out military operations at their own discretion without consulting **BLAŠKIĆ** and without any subsequent consequences.

The real commanders of the numerous HVO "special" units (the "Jokers", the "Tvrtkovci", the "Vitezovi", various military police units, the "Žuti" and others that are associated with war crimes and other criminal activity) were men such as **Valentin ĆORIĆ**, **Bruno STOJIC** and **Ivica RAJIĆ**, who directly pursued the idea of dividing BiH, and at the same time accrued great personal material gain through various criminal activities. This group was virtually "untouchable" because of their connections with the political circles in RH at that time.

A position in the military hierarchy was at that time obtained either through the legal military chain – whereby a person would be recommended to General **BLAŠKIĆ** for the position by military commanders, which **BLAŠKIĆ** would then approve – or through a decision of the so-called "shadow cabinet", led by **Dario KORDIĆ** and **Ignac KOŠTROMAN**. The "shadow cabinet" appointed people to positions and posts on the basis of family connections or a belief that they would carry out their orders unquestioningly, even though these people did not have the requisite professional knowledge for what they were to engage in. This frequently resulted in losses on the battlefield or other poorly executed operations.

The first commander of the military component of the HVO in Central Bosnia was **Paško LJUBIČIĆ**. The headquarters of the HVO military command for Central Bosnia was initially in Gornji Vakuf (Uskoplje), and was later moved to Vitez and then Busovača. In Central Bosnia there were four HVO military formations territorially deployed in Kiseljak, Vitez, Žepče and Vareš. These military formations

were manned mostly by volunteers and the local population. As a rule they were poorly armed, completely lacked any military organisation and were not coordinated among themselves. The commander of the military formation based in Kiseljak was **Ivica RAJIĆ**, in Žepče it was **Ivo LOZANČIĆ**, in Vitez it was **Paško LJUBIČIĆ**, while in Usora it was **JELAČA**. According to some of our intelligence, the headquarters were not in Usora but in Sarajevo, and were headed by a man named **Slavko**. Of the aforementioned commanders of operative groups, only the commanders of Usora and Žepče really obeyed **BLAŠKIĆ**'s orders.

The following special units, which were formally under the command of the Assistant Minister for Special Units in the Ministry of Defence of the HR HB **Ivica PRIMORAC**, but were actually commanded by **Dario KORDIĆ**, were active either permanently or temporarily in Central Bosnia:

- a) The Convicts Battalion, under the command of **Mladen NALETILIĆ** aka **Tuta**, whose sub-unit in Mostar was led by **Vinko MARTINOVIC** aka **Štela**.
- b) The "Maturice", under the command of **Dominik ILIJASEVIĆ** aka **Como**, who were active in Kiseljak.
- c) The "Vitezovi" /Knights/, who operated in the Vitez area under the command of **Darko KRALJEVIĆ**.
- d) The "Jokeri" /Jokers/, under the command of **Anto FURUNDŽIJA**¹.
- e) The "Žuti" /Yellow/ unit, under the command of **Žarko ANDRIĆ** aka **Žuti**.
- f) The "Apostoli" /Apostles/, a unit from the Travnik area which withdrew to Kiseljak, under the command of **Marinko ŠUNJIĆ**.

A military police force was also organized within the framework of the military units, and was the responsibility of **Valentin ČORIĆ**.

The SIS was also organized in the area. It was under the command of **Ante SLIŠKOVIĆ** and numbered around ten people (**Mišo MIJIĆ**, **VOLODER**, **Bruno**

¹ There is some dispute over who commanded the "Jokeri". Most sources assert that it was A. FURUNDŽIJA, but there are some that claim that KRALJEVIĆ was the commander. See the section entitled "Jokeri" for a more detailed discussion of this.

ŠARIĆ). **SLIŠKOVIĆ** was appointed to this post by **Darko KRALJEVIĆ**, who was responsible for the SIS at the HVO Main Staff.

Military Police

At the end of 1992 the HVO Military Police was established. The Central Bosnia area was covered by the 4th Military Police Battalion, which consisted of five companies and eight independent brigade platoons. The entire battalion and the companies were not commanded by the commander of the OZ or a brigade commander, but the Military Police Administration at the Ministry of Defence. The independent brigade platoons were commanded by the brigade commanders, i.e. the commanders of the units into which the platoons had been integrated.

The Military Police was restructured in January 1993 so that the brigade platoons were disbanded and three Military Police companies were formed. The entire battalion and the companies were not commanded by the commander of the OZ or a brigade commander, but the Military Police Administration. The Chief of the Military Police Administration was **Valentin ĆORIĆ**.

By the start of 1993 the HVO Military Police and the SIS had been established in Central Bosnia. The first commander of the Military Police was **Milivoj PETKOVIĆ** and the chief of the SIS was **Ante SLIŠKOVIĆ**. **Tihomir BLAŠKIĆ** was not happy about the establishment of these formations because they were outside his control and he did not command them; they were under the command of the HV /Croatian Army/ Ministry of Defence, and the HVO Main Staff. The commander of the HVO Main Staff at that time was **Slobodan PRALJAK**, and **Milivoj PETKOVIĆ** was appointed to the post later. The Defence Minister at that time was **Bruno STOJIĆ**.

The Jokeri /Jokers/

The *Jokeri* unit was a civilian unit, something akin to special police or an antiterrorist unit. They were quartered in the so-called "Bungalow", a small motel near Vitez. The unit mostly consisted of young men from Vitez and Travnik. According to some sources (for example **Blaženko RAMLJAK**), before the events in Ahmići this unit did

not participate in any military operations but engaged in looting abandoned Muslim houses and flats in the towns, seizing vehicles and committing other crimes. Some sources state that **KORDIĆ** mostly recruited prison convicts into this unit, and in exchange for being released from prison they had to swear that they would carry out absolutely all orders.

There are some contradictions in statements about who commanded the *Jokeri* unit, because according to **KOŠTROMAN** they were under **Darko KRALJEVIĆ**'s command, while all other intelligence indicated that the commander was **Anto FURUNDŽIJA**. **KOŠTROMAN** is probably trying to pin the blame for the crime on **KRALJEVIĆ** (according to the available information, **KRALJEVIĆ** and his unit the *Vitezovi* did not participate in the attack, just a small number of volunteers whom **KORDIĆ** and the others recruited on the eve of the attack). However, there is a possibility that both of them were commanders of the unit, i.e. it is not clear who succeeded whom in this post.

BiH SIS

On 23 July 1992, **Mate BOBAN** gave **Ivo LUČIĆ** the task of establishing the SIS in BiH, which was also joined by **Ivan BANDIĆ** at **LUČIĆ**'s behest. **BANDIĆ** then figured as the operations chief of the SIS, even though he had no order or letter of appointment for this. Numerous SISs were already in existence at that time, whereby the president of the municipality had his SIS, military commanders had their own, and so forth. **Ivo LUČIĆ**'s intention was to select the best people from these SIS formations, those who wished to act legally and within certain system of authority. The SIS in BiH was modelled on the SIS in RH, on the territorial principle and in units. SIS officers in units were subordinated to and under the direct influence of their commanders, and **LUČIĆ** and his colleagues from the SIS Administration attempted to win over some of the SIS officers from the units in order to acquire relevant information from the field. All reports arising from the work of the SIS in BiH were sent to **Ivo LUČIĆ**, who then forwarded them at his discretion either to **Mate BOBAN** or the chief of the Main Staff **STOJIC**, or sometimes to both of them, depending on the content of these reports.

As far as the Central Bosnia is concerned, at the beginning of the war there were two SIS in operation. One, under the authority of the HVO GS in Mostar, was formed in Vitez at the end of 1992 as the so-called Central Bosnia SIS Centre. It was headed by **Mišo MLJIĆ**. **MLJIĆ** is currently unreachable as he is in Australia. The other functioned within the *Nikola Šubić Zrinski* Busovača Brigade and was led by **Tomislav VLAJIĆ**. He was also at the disposal of **A. SLIŠKOVIĆ**, then **BLAŠKIĆ**'s assistant for SIS, but he did not recognise his authority and instead informed **KORDIĆ** of everything.

Mišo MLJIĆ, Chief of the SIS Centre in Travnik, at the end of May 1993, states that the Ministry of Defence of Herceg-Bosnia is dissatisfied with the work of **Anto SLIŠKOVIĆ**² who at that time filled the post of **BLAŠKIĆ**'s assistant for SIS in the Central Bosnia Operative Zone and who should, formally, have been in the security system of the Ministry of Defence of Herceg-Bosna, and who does not cooperate with the Ministry of Defence nor sends it any kind of reports. Because of this, the Ministry of Defence gave **Mišo MLJIĆ** the task of establishing the Vitez SIS Centre, which was directly responsible to the SIS Administration in Mostar, while **Ante SLIŠKOVIĆ** remained **BLAŠKIĆ**'s assistant for security.

During 1994 a HIS office numbering only a few people was formed in the SIS Administration in Mostar. The formation of the HIS enabled **Miroslav TUDJMAN**, through **Ivo LUČIĆ**, to extend his influence in the region under the control of the Croatian component in BiH. In so doing he came into conflict with the advocates of a different political option for BiH, particularly with **Ivić PAŠALIĆ** and **Markica REBIĆ** who wanted a conflict with the Muslims and whose man was **Dario KORDIĆ**. (**Ivan BANDIĆ** – Chief of BiH SIS Operational Organs).

According to the information at our disposal, **Ivica RASPUDIĆ** was in charge of operative activities in the SIS in BiH connected to The Hague. He is now allegedly in charge of the National Security Service Centre in Mostar.

c) The Crime in Ahmići

² **SLIŠKOVIĆ** is two-faced person who was, although formally subordinated to **BLAŠKIĆ**, a "player" of **Dario KORDIĆ**, who in that time was in Busovača. (part of the line redacted)

On 16 April 1993, 116 Muslim civilians and soldiers, including 15 children under 10 years old, were killed in Ahmići near Vitez.

The day before the attack, preparations were carried out and plans agreed at meetings with the commanders of military units. Much vagueness surrounds this. It is unclear how many meetings were held on the day before the attack on Ahmići, because there is a possibility that there was not just one meeting, but three. The sources conflict over the time and location of their holding and, of course, over the people who were present. According to the information available, it is most likely that two meetings were held with the commanders of the military units from this area – the first at 1400 hours in the cellar of the post office in Busovača (present were **Vlado ĆOSIĆ**, Assistant Commander for the Military Police, **Dario KORDIĆ**, **Ignac KOŠTROMAN**, **Paško LJUBIČIĆ**, **Darko KRALJEVIĆ** and **Vlado ĆOSIĆ**) at which **BLAŠKIĆ** issued orders about the attack and the manner of the attack, and the second without **BLAŠKIĆ**, according to the information at our disposal, in the evening in **KORDIĆ**'s family home. The decision to carry out the massacre was taken at this meeting, which is supported by the statement /part of the line redacted/ and information that A. NOBILO has (this should be cleared up by a follow up interview with /part of the line redacted/ - time of the meeting, who was present, what decisions were exactly brought at the second meeting and so forth). However, there is information that one meeting was held during the afternoon in a hotel in Vitez at which **BLAŠKIĆ** was also present. It is possible that this amounts only to confusion over the location of the meeting, but it should nevertheless be checked just at the conflicting information regarding the participants of these meetings should. There are statements saying that **BLAŠKIĆ** held this third meeting with the commanders of special-purpose units (**Paško LJUBIČIĆ**, **Žarko ANDRIĆ** aka **Žuti** and **Marinko ŽILIĆ** aka **Brzi**, a one-time member of the special police in Rijeka, current status being checked). **Mario ČERKEZ**, although invited, did not come. **BLAŠKIĆ** gave instructions for the attack at the meeting, and gave a stark warning forbidding any kind of crimes.

According to the information given by A. NOBILO, there was a command for the attack on the village of Ahmići according to which all the men should be killed by

being called out of their houses and killed with automatic weapons. Some bodies were burned with petrol which had been prepared in advance in bottles. According to NOBILO, these preparatory actions are one possible piece of evidence that the attack and the crime which took place there was planned in advance.

NOBILO states that there are written commands issued by BLAŠKIĆ for all this. This is corroborated by the fact that in his staff he also had a person whose task was to note everything he heard, the hour and minute when orders were issued or of other important activity, which was BLAŠKIĆ's war diary of sorts.

According to NOBILO, and /part of the line redacted/ on the night of 15/16 April 1993 a meeting of an informal group, composed of Ignac KOŠTROMAN, Dario KORDIĆ, Ante SLIŠKOVIC, Tomo VLAJIĆ, SLIŠKOVIC's deputy Paško LJUBIČIĆ, Vlado ČOSIĆ and Anto FURUNDŽIJA, was held at Dario KORDIĆ's house. This group wanted conflict with the Muslims at any price. At this meeting it was agreed that an order would be issued to kill the entire male population in Ahmići and to torch the village. As an illustration, NOBILO states that one of the participants of the meeting asked what should be done with the children and most probably Ignac KOŠTROMAN answered that they too would "one day be men", thereby making it clear that they should execute them, too.

The aim of this operation was to scare the Muslim population into moving out of the area, the same method which had been applied in other parts of BiH, particularly by the Serbs.

This informal group was also united by family ties. Dario KORDIĆ's sister was the girlfriend of Paško LJUBIČIĆ, Vlado ČOSIĆ was a relative of Paško LJUBIČIĆ and *kum* /close family friend/ to Tomo VLAJIĆ, while Anto SLIŠKOVIC's brother married Dario KORDIĆ's wife's sister.

According to the information available, several units participated in the attack of Ahmići:

- The *Jokeri* /Jokers/ unit as part of the 4th battalion of the HVO VP /Military Police/ (about 60 people under the command of A. **FURUNDŽIJA**, operated from the direction of the village of Nadioci),
- The 4th battalion of the VP from Posušje, commanded by **Paško LJUBIČIĆ**,
- **Miroslav BRALO** aka **Cicko** also participated in the attack and committed crimes without anyone's orders and did not belong to any unit,
- The unit of **Žarko ANDRIĆ** aka **Žuti**,
- Parts of other units of the HVO Central Bosnia Operative Zone participated in the conflict since, because of the confused situation, there was no firm system of command (about 20 volunteers from the *Vitezovi* /Knights/ antiaircraft defence unit)³

Following increased kidnappings, robberies and skirmishes begun by the Muslim forces and because of the danger that these forces might sever communications between Vitez and Busovača, a decision was taken by the military leadership of the Central Bosnia Operative Zone, which was then headed by General **BLAŠKIĆ**, that the HVO would attack the Muslims first on the Vitez-Busovača axis in order to create a security belt against the Muslims. This decision was based on previous experiences of Muslim attacks in Travnik where they attacked first and gained a great advantage in later combat activity, or acquired a relatively large swath of territory for combat operations.

General **BLAŠKIĆ** issued a written command which ordered that the aforementioned communications must be relieved at all costs but in a manner by which they would occupy the hills above the village. According to the order, the village should only have been entered if armed resistance was offered from a house or another building. In such an instance, the command read, they could open fire on the building from which the shooting was coming, but only to the extent necessary to neutralise armed resistance. It was specifically ordered that houses and buildings which offered no

³ The *Vitezovi* were the remnants of the HOS /Croatian Defence Forces/. Only about 20 volunteers from the unit participated in the attack because at that time their commander, **Darko KRALJEVIĆ** was in Ljubuški where he had gone to collect pay for members of his unit. (**Žarko ŠOKČIĆ**).

resistance should be avoided and that during the first phase of the operation, until the positions in the hills overlooking the village had been occupied, they should not be entered. This order was also received by **Mario ČERKEZ**, Commander of the HVO Vitez Brigade.

The direct commanders in the field who carried out the order issued were **Vlado ČOSIĆ**, **Paško LJUBIČIĆ** and **Vlado ŠANTIĆ**, while **Anto SLIŠKOVIĆ** was commander of the military police in General **BLAŠKIĆ**'s staff. According to the information available, in the middle of April 1993 an envelope sent from Mostar containing an order to relieve the Vitez-Busovača road (communication), was received by the 4th battalion of the HVO VP. The battalion commander at this time was **Paško LJUBIČIĆ**, his superior was **Valentin ČORIĆ**, Chief of the VP Administration of Herceg-Bosna. **Ante SLIŠKOVIĆ** received the envelope containing the order for conducting the attack on the village of Ahmići.

Paško LJUBIČIĆ coordinated the attack on Ahmići using hand-held radio equipment. **Tihomir BLAŠKIĆ** was also present in the area during the attack itself. There were MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ units in the village of Ahmići, and their fiercest resistance came from the mosque and the school (the source of the above mentioned is: /part of the line redacted/; this part is not stated in the document under the ERN 0151-1033-0151-1053/.

On the evening prior to the attack on Ahmići, **Paško LJUBIČIĆ** went, either alone or with **Ante SLIŠKOVIĆ**, to the prison where they told the prisoners that they would release anyone who was willing to kill anything that moved. In this way **Miroslav BRALO aka Cicko** was released from prison where he had been because of the murder of a Muslim family, as were other criminals.

Of the evidence available regarding the crime in the village of Ahmići, there is, as **Anto NOBILO** states, /in the document under the ERN: 0151-1033-0151-1053 instead of **NOBILO**'s name it is stated: "a video recording made by the members of UNPROFOR who went into Ahmići with two armoured vehicles at the time of the attack and whose vehicle removed wounded Muslims from the battle area to a nearby hill. There is also a video recording of the arrival of Commander **STUART** of the

British UNPROFOR forces with the ambassadors of several Western countries and a video clip from Busovača TV, which found its way into the hands of the AID /Agency for Investigation and Documentation/ Muslim intelligence service, with footage of an HVO Military Police camp known as *Bungalov* /Bungalow/ immediately after the attack on Ahmići. This footage shows military policemen, identified as **Vlado ŠANTIĆ** and **Paško LJUBIČIĆ**, returning from the fighting.

As evidence, he states the statements given by the witnesses to the crime in Ahmići, who were interviewed by the investigating judge from the Zenica District Court and which have been delivered to The Hague by the Zenica Security Services Centre.

Furthermore, he mentions video recordings and witness statements of the UNPROFOR members who exhumed a mass grave in which the victims from Ahmići had been buried.

According to NOBILO, **Ante SLIŠKOVIĆ**⁴ masterminded the operation in Ahmići. He and **Dario KORDIĆ** are political kindred spirits and both of them were founders of the HDZ /Croatian Democratic Union/ in Busovača in 1991.

d) ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE COMMAND OF THE HVO, SIS AND CERTAIN CROATIAN SERVICES AFTER THE CRIME

In their initial reactions the Croatian military and political leadership were united in their stance that the crime in Ahmići was not committed by Croatian forces, but had been "staged" by the Muslims, the Serbs or even the international forces, by members of the British peacekeeping forces based there. Many reports were compiled about the crime in Ahmići, some of which are unavailable. It is assumed that it is precisely these reports which would be most important in elucidating the whole incident.

Ignac KOŠTROMAN claims that he learnt of the crime in Ahmići through the media. **Dario KORDIĆ** and **Tihomir BLAŠKIĆ** were at the time allegedly at the military headquarters in Busovača. None of the three issued an order for the operation

⁴ According to the SIS' documentation, **Ante SLIŠKOVIĆ** remained the employee of that Service during 1996 and 1997. MORH also appointed him as coordinator in the search for witnesses for the Court in The Hague, during the execution of the OA "Istina" /Truth/. According to NOBILO, he is a very intelligent person, former chess player, who uses his intellectual abilities for evil purposes.

but instead advocate the thesis that the British UN forces, in agreement with the Muslim forces and Croatian criminals organised and carried out the operation in Ahmići. He bases this on the fact that he /as printed/ knew that the AD (Muslim intelligence service) had already been formed at this time and that it had disseminated misinformation in BiH through the world media. As evidence of this he alleges that the UN forces led by the British officer **STUART** were the first into Ahmići, **STUART** was shown next to dead bodies in Ahmići. He personally ordered that an investigation into this incident should be carried out and that he should be informed of the results of this investigation as a matter of urgency.

Tihomir BLAŠKIĆ told **Ante SLIŠKOVIĆ**, Chief of the SIS for the Central Bosnia Military District, to carry out an investigation into the incident so that he could send a report to Mostar. **SLIŠKOVIĆ**, however, allegedly obstructed the investigation, repeating the theory about the involvement of the Serbs, the Muslims and the British in "staging" the crime.

After the Military Police unit had committed the crime in Ahmići, of which **BLAŠKIĆ** informed **Dario KORDIĆ** by telephone, **BLAŠKIĆ** asked for a report into the incident, which was compiled and signed by **Vlado ČOSIĆ** on behalf of **Paško LJUBIČIĆ** who was the commander of the Military Police. According to the information available, the report does not mention the crime, only the fighting. (NOBILO).

There is allegedly a report into the incident at Ahmići from Ivo **LUČIĆ** which was sent to the Assistant Minister for Security in BiH, and an analytical report by the HIS. These reports are, apparently, incomplete and are only reconstructions of the incident of summaries of more extensive reports, which should be in the SIS HZ HB /Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosnia/ archive.

e) THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF CROATIA AND THE STATE AND POLITICAL ORGANS IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE CRIME IN AHMIĆI

The Croatian political leadership had mainly accurate information at its disposal about the extent of the crime, its circumstances, victims, perpetrators, etc. In a document

English Translation

EF 0281-6426-0281-6460

entitled *The Massacre in Ahmići* the RH presented on 21 March 1994 a comparatively accurate version of events in Ahmići which was taken from the newspaper *Le Figaro*.

On the other hand, based on the premise that the RH is in no way guilty for the war in BiH, that blame lies entirely with the Muslims and the Serbs, and that the international community offered no support to the RH, the SIS RH began an investigation into crimes committed by Muslims and Serbs against Croats in BiH. In order to corroborate these crimes, documentation from BiH was delivered to the RH and people were prepared for possible testimony in trials in The Hague. Identification papers and other such items were procured for individuals who came to the RH (by *Lora*, the SIS in Split). However, it is obvious that the analysis of the crime in Ahmići was conducted in parallel and that the documents which are now stored in the offices of the SIS in Split were also transferred from BiH to the RH. **UDILJAK**, **IVANOVIĆ**⁵, **KRPAN**, **B. MILAS**, **Mato ZEKO** and others were involved in realization of these actions.

The first signs of involvement of individual parts of the Croatian intelligence services in the events and investigation into Ahmići were obvious soon after it became apparent that the BiH SIS, that is **Ante SLIŠKOVIC** was conducting the investigation inefficiently. During 1993, /part of the line redacted/⁶, who presented himself as an SIS officer from Zagreb detailed to gather information about the events in Ahmići, was in Travnik and Busovača. In the two months **DAMJANOVIĆ** spent in the area he made contact with many people.

According to the information available **Ante GUGIĆ** was also in the area and later compiled and "expert" report in which there are no details of either the perpetrators or the circumstances of the crime.

⁵ NOBILO thinks that **UDILJAK** and **IVANOVIĆ** are persons of in the confidence of Ante **SLIŠKOVIC**, and Markica **REBIĆ** assigned them to him in order to help him in his work.

⁶ During 1996, at the baptism of **BLAŠKIĆ**'s younger son, there was /part of the line redacted, but most likely it is the name of Ante **DAMJANOVIĆ** written/ who did not want to talk about the results of his investigation. () /comment in the brackets redacted/

/Two footnotes do not exist in the document under the ERN 0151-1033-0151-1053/.

Involvement of the Croatian ob. /intelligence/ organizations is obvious from the fact that **Ivica PRIMORAC**, HR H-B Assistant Minister of Defence in charge for security, was directly responsible to **Markica REBIĆ**, the then RH Assistant Minister of Defence, for execution of the tasks related to The Hague.

/this part is missing in the document under the ERN 0151-1033-0151-1053/

At the beginning of 1997, operative action "Process", was undertaken, and this was organized without planning documents and it was based on the verbal agreement of the Head of HIS at that time, **M. /Miroslav/ TUDJMAN** and Chief of the HIS Operations Department, Mr. **Ivo LUČIĆ**. The goal of this action was the monitoring of the trial of General **BLAŠKIĆ** which had already begun. Within OA "Process", operative actions "The Hague", "Road" and "Truth" were organized. Operative actions "Put" and "Istina" were under the jurisdiction of the RH Ministry of Defence, that is, SIS, while the operative action "Haag" should have been under the jurisdiction of other state ministries, above all the MUP and Ministry of Justice. However, it was not implemented, so the SIS continued covering the operative aspects of the action. The coordinator of the affairs regarding operative actions "Put" and "Istina" was Major **Stipan UDILJAK**. He also led all activities for the MORH SIS. HIS also participated in that action, and after analyzing collected information, it was submitting analysis to the SIS (all the information was kept in the HIS on electronic media. The main coordinator for gathering information about people who could be used as witnesses in the trial of **BLAŠKIĆ** on the territory of BiH, was **Ante SLIŠKOVIĆ**.

f) MANIPULATION OF HVO DOCUMENTATION

Because of the war in BiH and internal conflicts in the Croatian political and military leadership, HVO documentation, including parts relating to events in Ahmići, was often subject to various forms of manipulation. Thus, for example, in the middle of December 1993 **Bruno ŠARIĆ** received a message from his commander **MIJIĆ**, via a helicopter co-pilot who was also an SIS operative, that he had agreed with the SIS Administration in Mostar to transfer all his documentation by helicopter from Vitez to Mostar. Although it had been agreed with **Marinko POLAR**, the Commander of the Military Police that a certain amount of SIS documentation be transferred from Vitez

to Mostar, BLAŠKIĆ's bodyguards prevented this at gunpoint while they were attempting to load the package with the documentation onto the helicopter.

A similar situation is described in the statement of **Ivan BANDIĆ**, who states that all reports concerning Ahmići were kept in the SIS archives. At the end of 1994, or at the beginning of 1995, **Ivo LUČIĆ** relocated the archives to several towns in BiH, and then he transferred it to the HIS headquarters in Zagreb all because of the danger that **Mladen NALETILIĆ aka Tuta** could get hold of it. Concerning the above references, he states that a female employee /part of the line redacted/ was assigned to the SIS team that was established as a help to the defence attorneys of The Hague's detainees and she had the possibility to see the documentation.

Activities concerning usage of HVO documentation intensified in the context of gathering physical evidence for the trial in The Hague and BLAŠKIĆ's defence, but also material regarding defence of the Croats in BiH, that is, concerning the crimes committed by the Muslims and the Serbs against the Croats in BiH. Because of this, and also because of the fear that the HVO documentation could fall into the hands of SFOR⁷, a decision was made that the documentation that has intelligence significance should be withdrawn from BiH. That part of the job was carried out by the SIS in Split, and that is how a total of 4 vans full of materials were transferred and archived in the facilities of the SIS (part of the line redacted) and that was according to the order issued by **Markica REBIĆ** and **Ante GUGIĆ**. Operational hiding and the storage of documents was carried out by the members of the SIS Split. /whole line redacted/

However, the documentation was not systematized after it had been archived, nor analyzed, but it was sitting there untouched for two years. There is a possibility that a smaller part of the documentation was processed in order to analyze war crimes committed by the Army of BiH and MOS against Croats. Specifically, in January 1998, a working meeting was called by **Ante GUGIĆ**, the then Chief of the SIS Administration, and employees of the SIS Administration attended /part of the line redacted/ from the Military Police Administration /part of the line redacted/. An operative team was formed at that meeting, and it consisted of employees that were

⁷ It was disclosed in the media that SFOR was searching for that documentation in BiH.

present at the meeting. The team was tasked to gather information concerning crimes committed by the Muslims against Croats in BiH. /Part of the line redacted/ went to Mostar, from where they brought around 70 (seventy) registers that included assorted documentation about crimes committed by the Muslims against Croats in BiH. Several folders had documents that referred to the crimes committed by Serbs against Croats in BiH. They received the above mentioned folders from the HVO Military Police Administration and from the Commission for Imprisoned and Missing Persons in HR H-B. After the above mentioned persons brought the documents to the SIS's Split Department, and /part of the line redacted/ from the Military Police Administration from 24 January 1998 to 10 February 1998 they made a report under the title "War crimes committed against Croats from the second half of 1992 to April 1994 by the BiH Army and MOS."

In March 2000 a request arrived from the SIS Administration (signed by /part of the line redacted/) to the SIS Split Department to submit the information concerning the current state of the processed documentation about OA "Haag". Following a reply that the SIS department does not know anything about the action with that code name, in March 2000 came /part of the line redacted/ RH /part of the line redacted/ to the SIS Split Department, with the previous oral order of Mr. **Mladen RUŽMAN**, Assistant Minister of Defence for Intelligence and Security Affairs. On this occasion, they informed the Chief of SIS Split Department of the decision made by **Jozo RADOS**, RH Minister of Defence that they take over the responsibility for the HVO archival material which was placed in the SIS Split Department.

From the entire collection HVO material, they separated certain archival material that was loaded into one truck and sent to Zagreb to the barracks /part of the line redacted/, where the HVO archival material was taken by /part of the line redacted/ Chief of Department /part of the line redacted/ of the SIS Administration with /part of the line redacted/ 10 employees. There was no record made regarding transfer between the employees of the Split SIS Department and employees of Zagreb SIS Administration of archival material in the above mentioned truck, but /part of the line redacted/ warned members of the Split SIS Department to continue to protect information regarding transfer of the HVO archival material to Zagreb.

Following the announcement of **Mladen RUŽMAN**, in April 2000 /part of the line redacted/ and one employee of the MORH Intelligence and Analytical Department, came to the Split SIS Department and took away 10 – 15 boxes of the archival material to Zagreb.

**g) PREPARATION OF WITNESSES FOR TESTIFYING IN THE HAGUE
ABOUT AHMIĆI**

Available information shows that **Ante SLIŠKOVIĆ**, **Stipan UDILJAK** /part of the line redacted/ and occasionally **Ignac KOŠTROMAN** as well, were entrusted with preparing witnesses and gathering of documentation for The Hague. In September 1997, the SIS Administration ordered the SIS's Split Department to provide the technical assistance and to offer the logistical support necessary for the preparation of witnesses for **NOBILO's** defence team. According to the order, the employees of the Split SIS were in charge of their logistical support.

In September 1997, the SIS Administration ordered the Split SIS to provide the technical conditions for **Ante NOBILO's** team for preparation of witnesses, who were planned to be used in the **Tihomir BLAŠKIĆ's** defence in The Hague. Preparation of the first group of witnesses by **A. NOBILO's** defence team started in October 1997. Later, beside the defence team of **NOBILO**, witnesses for The Hague were prepared in the Split SIS Department by counsels **NAUMOVSKI** (for **Dario KORDIĆ**), **Goran MIKULIČIĆ**, **Jadranka SLAKOVIĆ-GLUMAC**, (sic.) **MIŠETIĆ**, and American counsels **Rasel (sic.) HAYMAN** and **Turner SMITH**. According to available information, the last preparation of witnesses in the Split SIS was carried out in January 2000. According to available information, there were 13 sessions of preparation in total from October 1997 to January 2000. The preparations included approximately 300 witnesses, and entire run of preparations lasted around 80 days. The technical support that the Split SIS offered consisted of reception for witnesses from Central Bosnia (the Department accepted about 300 witnesses in that period). The witnesses were brought by /part of the line redacted/ and the technical support also consisted of reservations of hotel rooms; providing adequate facilities for preparations of witnesses and in some cases the placing of speakers, that is,

microphones in the facilities in order to simulate for the witnesses conditions similar to those in the courtroom in The Hague; and audio recording of statements.⁸ From the Split SIS Department /part of the line redacted/ cooperated most closely with /part of the line redacted/ in organisation of work.

The Chief of the Administration, Staff Brigadier **Ante GUGIĆ**, as well as employees of the Zagreb SIS Administration / line redacted/ came on several occasions to the SIS's Split Department for preparations of witnesses who were to appear in court in The Hague. Before the "Vitez group" went to The Hague, the then Head of the HIS **Miroslav TUDJMAN**, Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs **Željko SAČIĆ**, Advisor to the President of the Republic of Croatia for Domestic Politics **Ivić PAŠALIĆ**, Chief /part of the line redacted/, as well as employees of the Split and Dalmatian PU /Police Administration/ had visited the SIS's Split Department. On that occasion, TUDJMAN and PAŠALIĆ talked to several foreign citizens in the facilities of the Split SIS, most probably regarding departure of the "Vitez group" to The Hague. According to available information, **Markica REBIĆ** never once stayed in the Split SIS Department (he was accommodated in the hotel "Dujlovo" in Split).

An important person in the process of preparing of the procedure for defence of The Hague's detainees, was **Ivan LALIĆ**⁹, who is according to NOBILO a positive person, but who is afraid. **Ivica PRIMORAC** was the one who gave the orders to LALIĆ.

After General **Milivoj PETKOVIĆ** testified in front of The Hague's Tribunal during the trial against General **BLAŠKIĆ**, defence counsel **Anto NOBILO** stated for the media that general PETKOVIĆ testified falsely to the detriment of general **BLAŠKIĆ**. After that, the HIS made detailed analysis of this case¹⁰, and determined that PETKOVIĆ really had given a false statement. It was also determined that generals **Davor DOMAZET** and **Ante GOTOVINA**, as well as **Stipan UDILJAK** and

⁸ All audio recordings were, allegedly, handed over to NOBILO, and they were not kept in the Split SIS Department.

⁹ In cooperation with the Office for Cooperation with The Hague's Tribunal, **LALIĆ** organized transportation of witnesses to The Hague; he organized care for the families of detainees; he financed persons that were trying to escape The Hague's Tribunal; he was giving a monthly salary to **Paško LJUBIČIĆ** and **Vlado ČOSIĆ**.

¹⁰ In which process he was also using a transcript of **PETKOVIĆ**'s secret testimony.

Markica REBIĆ were preparing¹¹ General Milivoj PETKOVIĆ for giving his statement before the ICTY. Those preparations were made on the premises of the Office of the President of the Republic of Croatia.

h) CONFLICT BETWEEN ANTO NOBILO AND OPERATIVE GROUP "THE HAGUE"

At the end of September 1998 the lawyer **Anto NOBILO** began his case for the defence in the trial of General **BLAŠKIĆ**, and soon sought documentation from the SIS which might be of use to the defence, particularly regarding events in Ahmići. However, the SIS did not send the documentation he requested, explaining that the requested investigation report did not exist because no investigation had been carried out. NOBILO then gave several interviews to the press in which he took the SIS to task for hampering his defence. Officials from the SIS denied this and even threatened NOBILO.

While working with witnesses, according to NOBILO's statements, **Ante SLIŠKOVIĆ** caused many problems, because NOBILO had attempted to prove the existence of a parallel chain of command, which did not suit **Dario KORDIĆ** or the people devoted to him since he was deputy to **Mate BOBAN**, who in turn took his instructions from the HDZ leadership in Zagreb, whose connection to events in BiH it was wished to conceal. Because of the aforementioned problems with the SIS coordinator, NOBILO said in public that there were secret indictments from the Hague Tribunal against **Paško LJUBIČIĆ** and **Ante SLIŠKOVIĆ**, after which SLIŠKOVIĆ disappeared from that area.

In order to reduce misunderstanding and conflict between NOBILO and the SIS, the MORH's Assistant Minister for Security **Markica REBIĆ** called a meeting, where SIS employees led by **Stipan UDILJAK**, counsel **Anto NOBILO** and /part of the line redacted/ were present as SIS representatives. At that meeting Stipan UDILJAK tried to convince NOBILO that the SIS did not conduct an investigation concerning the event in Ahmići and there is no report for it. /Part of the line redacted/ affirmed that there is a report on the SIS premises /part of the line redacted/

¹¹ There is saved information concerning the preparation of General PETKOVIĆ and who participated in it, as well as information about HIS.

redacted/, which **Markica REBIĆ** and **Stipan UDILJAK** commented upon, saying that he had lost his mind and "gone completely mad" and that he couldn't see the above mentioned report because it does not exist. After a raucous fight, Markica REBIĆ admitted that the report exists and that they would forward it to the HIS, so that the HIS could decide whether they would give it to **NOBILO** or not.

3. INFORMATION CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT OF SUSPECTS BETWEEN 1996 AND 2000

In accordance with conclusions brought by the Co-ordination Committee of the Intelligence Community working on the "Ahmići case", the MUP paid special attention to and used all available means and methods to find out the current whereabouts of **Ante SLIŠKOVIĆ, Paško SLIŠKOVIĆ** /sic, as stated; probably **LJUBIČIĆ, Tomo VLAJIC and Vlado ČOSIĆ**, for whom there reason to suspect that they organised the action in Ahmići and also committed crimes against prisoners of war and civilians.

Available information indicates that from 1996, to today, certain members of the RH Ministry of Defence, and especially the MORH's Security and Information Service /SIS/ were in charge of taking care of the suspects. After it had become clear that The Hague Tribunal was interested in the above mentioned four, those services organized their transfer from BiH to RH, and subsequently their hiding at different locations. Services of other MORH departments were also used, as certain members of the MORH's Political Administration (**Ignjac KOŠTROMAN**) and **Ljubo ČESIC** aka. Rojs from the HV 66th Engineering Corps Regiment and other persons connected with him, through which the hiding of the suspects was financed. Some local government services were also used for hiding suspects (Starigrad, Primošten, etc,) and in case of any problems, suspects were instructed to invoke the names of local SIS employees as a reference.

Collected data shows that members of the group were often changing places of residence, for example, after the press published some articles about them and especially after this year's elections in RH. It is registered that the source saw them or

contacted them and that the police asked them to show their identity documents (real documents, that is, identification data), and there are some indications that they were resident at several locations in RH. However, using adequate measures and actions, it has been established that they probably stayed on the territory of Zadar hinterland, that is, Karin and Maslenica, where they were located in Serbs' houses and/or weekend cottages that were the property of SRJ /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ citizens (Karin), and in the facilities that were the property of some HV /Croatian Army/ members (Maslenica). Hiding those persons was facilitated by the fact that those are the places where -- particularly in the case of Karin -- after 1995 several thousands of people from all parts of RH and especially BiH were settled. The local authorities there are mainly former or current members of the MORH, mostly from Central Bosnia, and the work of regular RH MUP police was more difficult there. Information that we have at our disposal reveals that accommodation in Maslenica was organised in facilities that are the property of Ante ORECA (the former commander of 66th Regiment), and/or, Jerolim NEKIĆ, employee of the Zadar customs-house. According to the source, persons that were staying there urgently left the above mentioned facilities after the information about them hiding in that area had been made public.

Although we don't have information concerning their further residence, available information indicates that Anto SLIŠKOVIĆ, the informal leader of the group who had the most contacts with officials of the former RH government and information and security apparatus (SIS and HIS), and Tomislav VLAJIĆ were at the end of May on the territory of Umag, in the Maređa settlement near Novigrad, at the house of their friend from BiH, Vendo BOŠNJAK. They were hiding under false identities and they were avoiding contacts with familiar persons, and after they had spent the night, they left Novigrad.

It is also necessary to mention that Ignac KOŠTROMAN -- for whom there are some indications that he also participated in hiding of the group -- said in his interview that Miroslav BRALO aka Cicko had visited him in the middle of April. He was accompanied by Marko ĐAPIĆ, owner of the car wash in Knin, who was born in BiH, and who is an established connection of the group. On that occasion, BRALO told him that he was allegedly passing through Knin and that he dropped by only to

"show him that he was alive" and to let him know that he knows where KOŠTROMAN and his family are staying. KOŠTROMAN said that he took BRALO's statement as a threat, but it is possible that he said that as an excuse for his own lack of cooperativeness in giving the information about current whereabouts of members of the group and BRALO himself.

According to his own statement, given during an interview, /part of the line redacted/ is also in touch with SLIŠKOVIĆ. He was a member of the Busovača HVO at the time and currently he is a driver employed in the MORH, residing in Zagreb and in /part of the line redacted/. SLIŠKOVIĆ, allegedly, "snapped" and a normal conversation is not possible with him. According to /part of the line redacted/ SLIŠKOVIĆ and his friends don't have any financial means for living, but they are determined not to surrender, because they don't trust anyone anymore. /Part of the line redacted/ refused to reveal where those persons are, but, as he stated, the location is "known to the SIS".

According to information that we consider reliable, Marko ĐAPIĆ, whom we had already mentioned, occasionally had contacts with SLIŠKOVIĆ over the telephone. According to ĐAPIĆ, SLIŠKOVIĆ stated that he was at a safe place. He says that he has documentation at his disposal, which refers to wartime events and that he is keeping it if necessary. Although he admitted that he had contacts with SLIŠKOVIĆ, ĐAPIĆ stated that he was not aware of his current whereabouts.

Movements and contacts of certain group members from 1997 (that is, since they have been hiding) up to now, were reconstructed with operative work.

Available information shows that Anto SLIŠKOVIĆ was seen in the Zadar area, in Pošedarje on several occasions, where he was asked for his papers on 25 November 1998 while being accompanied by Tomislav VLAJIĆ (which was the last time that was undoubtedly established that he was using documents in his own name). He was also seen in the area of Istria (Umag, Novigrad, border with Slovenia), as well as in Zagreb, where it was noticed that he stayed on a couple of occasions on the premises of the RH Ministry of Defence in Zagreb, as well as in different clubs and catering establishments which people from Central Bosnia usually visit.

It was noted that during March 1998, SLIŠKOVIĆ was staying in the area of Primošten. Josip PERKOV, the then-President of Primošten Municipality, requested from members of police that the place in which he and two more persons (Ivica KRIŠTO and Miroslav PETKOVIĆ, both from the area of Busovača where they currently reside) were residing remain a secret, because they are "really important persons who will go to The Hague as witnesses." After the intervention of a police patrol, SLIŠKOVIĆ called the Assistant Head of the MORH SIS Department in Šibenik, Mladen CRLJEN, who said that the persons caught in the act were "under the exclusive jurisdiction of the MORH SIS" (checking the afore-mentioned information was requested on 7 June 2000 from the MORH Sector for Intelligence and Security Affairs).

According to statements given by several people, at the end of 1999 SLIŠKOVIĆ bought a family house somewhere in the area of Zagreb. After that, he celebrated with friends in the catering facility "Gabrek" in Samobor, where /part of the line redacted/ of SIS and MORH in charge for hiding him were also present.

The money for purchase was allegedly provided for SLIŠKOVIĆ by his and LJUBIČIĆ's patron, Valentin ČORIĆ, to whom SLIŠKOVIĆ complained, saying that a house had been bought for Paško LJUBIČIĆ and not for him. There is a possibility that the transaction was carried out through the *Agencija za prodaju netrketnina* /Real Estate Agency,/ meaning that the sale and purchase was completed in one of the once-occupied parts of RH (Knin, Petrinja, Vukovar etc.).

According to their own statements, SIS officials /part of the line redacted/ were occasionally in contact with SLIŠKOVIĆ from 1996 to 2000, first "officially" (while SLIŠKOVIĆ was in charge of "co-ordination" for the preparation of potential witnesses for The Hague) and after that when he went "underground." Until 1999, the meetings were held in the MORH, and after that in catering facilities ("Gabrek" in Samobor, tavern "Dida" in Petrova Street in Zagreb, etc). SLIŠKOVIĆ also had contacts with SIS officials in Split /part of the line redacted/, in order to provide "technical assistance" to defence teams while preparing witnesses for the trials in The Hague. He was driving a dark blue VW Passat with BiH license plates. /Part of the

line redacted/ said that he spoke over the phone with SLIŠKOVIĆ for the last time in May 1999.

Available information indicates that **Vlado ĆOSIĆ** lived in the tourist settlement Mareda near Novigrad from the beginning of 1994 to the end of 1998. (he is registered on the territory of Umag), where he had a small grocery store and café bar on rented premises. After that, he was engaged in the import of used cars from Western countries, and in their transport to BiH through RH. Since there was suspicion that he had violated the law, the 3rd Police Station in Buje initiated a criminal investigation and filed criminal charges with the municipal court in Buje. At the beginning of 2000, he was declared a wanted man. We do not know ĆOSIĆ's current whereabouts. His family (wife) currently resides in Bušovača.

Regarding other members of the group, we should mention that, except for some information that **Valentin ĆORIĆ** allegedly purchased a house for **Paško LJUBIČIĆ**, there is no direct information which would indicate that the latter had been seen from the beginning of 1999 to today on RH territory. After checking, we found out that the claims that he attended the Higher Maritime School or Faculty in Rijeka in the 1990s, are not true. The last confirmed information regarding his stay on the territory of RH with his personal identification documents originates from 13 January 1997, when he was asked to show his papers at the border crossing in Jurovski Brod, in a vehicle that used to have Herceg-Bosna licence plates.

According to what /part of the line redacted/ had stated, during 1999 Tomislav **VLAJIĆ** was often coming to the SIS Administration in Zagreb, where his wife was receiving medical treatment on several occasions. We do not have any information about his movements during 2000.

The above-mentioned **Miroslav BRALO** aka Cicko, was allegedly accommodated in the hotel "Čitluk" in Čitluk during 1997 or 1998 and he was under the protection of **Ivica PRIMORAC**. It was noted that during those years, he resided with his parents who are currently in Knin. After that, he returned to Vitez, and as was mentioned, information indicates that he stayed in the area around Zadar until April 2000. According to what the source stated, while in BiH BRALO was visiting SFOR

members on several occasions and while under the influence of alcohol he "turned himself in" for participation in the crime committed in Ahmići. Also, he had contacts with Frank DUTTON, representative of The Hague Tribunal, threatening that he "would tell everything about everyone's actions when the crime in Ahmići was committed". This year, however, it was not recorded in actual documents that he had stayed on RH territory and we do not have any information that he was secretly in Knin.

Also, according to the statement of /part of the line redacted/ until middle of April 2000, Ivica ANTOLOVIĆ aka Sjano was together with BRALO in Karin. According to available information, he is also one of the perpetrators that committed the crime in Ahmići.

Available information shows that members of the group were financed from different sources. According to what Anto NOBILO, defence counsel for T. BLAŠKIĆ, said, the financing of the above-mentioned was organized by Ivan LALIĆ, whose direct superior was Ivica PRIMORAC, who was then Chief of the HZ /Croatian Community/ of Herceg-Bosna National Security Service. Money for the persons who were on the run would be paid through the firm "Monitor", controlled by Ljubo ČESIĆ aka Rojs. Through LALIĆ, NOBILO allegedly also organised meetings with the suspects who were on the run at the time.

However, it is quite possible that financing of the group was carried out by former officials of "Herceg-Bosna" (now the Croatian component of the BiH Federation,) especially the afore-mentioned Valentin ČORIĆ. We should note the fact that during the action in Ahmići, ČORIĆ was directly superior to P. LJUBIČIĆ, and that ČORIĆ's role in the organisation of the action (and possibly in planning of the crime) is still not clear.

4. THE ISSUE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS AND PROBLEMS WITH IDENTIFICATION OF THE SUSPECTS

During May and June 2000, several articles appeared in Croatian newspapers. In those articles it was stated that the SZUP /Service for the Protection of the Constitutional

Order/ issued personal identity documents with false identity information to the persons who were involved in committing the crime in Ahmići. On 28 March of this year, the head of the SZUP ordered an investigation into; whether the SZUP had issued forged documents to the above-mentioned persons or not; how many forged documents were made and which documents they were; and to what institutions besides the MUP /Ministry of Interior/ those documents were submitted and in what number.

Records on the compilation of forged documents in the SZUP exist from 7 September 1992. Except for the SZUP's needs, that is the needs of the MUP, RH Documents were also made for the needs of other services and institutions. That is how 4 identity cards, 18 passports and 7 driver's licences were made for the HIS /Croatian Information Service/.

For the MORH SIS, 3 identity cards were made, as well as 5 passports (there were 4 more passports made for the MORH) and 7 driver's licences. Beside the above mentioned, a total of 8 passports and 9 passports of the former SFRJ /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/ (red ones) were made. From the available documentation, it could be seen that 50 blank forms (cards) for RH passports were delivered, but their actual purpose could not be determined from the documentation. We also know that in the HIS during 1997 and 1998, preparations were being made for the independent production of forged RH documents.

In the period between 1995 and 1999, a smaller number of documents were made in the SZUP for the needs of the HR H-B SNS /National Security Service/. But here, there were no personal documents but only driver's licences, green cards and registration plates for vehicles. According to available information, members of the SNS in Mostar (I. PRIMORAC and I. LUČIĆ) were making or preparing forged documents, which opens the possibility that members of the group were provided with those documents.

According to the statements given by /part of the line redacted/, a SIS official from Split, during 1995 and 1996, Ante SLIŠKOVIĆ was in charge of the operation for providing the false identities and documents.

Based on the information that persons who were suspects of committing the crime had at their disposal documents with false identity information, as well as indications that documents were issued to them in the names of Ivan TOMAS and Ivan BRĐANOVIĆ, a check of several sources was carried out. Based on the analysis of documents that was carried out, and comparing the available photographs and contacts with the sources etc, we think that LJUBIČIĆ has actually been using (or he used) forged documents in the name of Ivan TOMAS. Concerning sources that stated differently, we assume that it was either a mistake or /deliberate/ hiding of the above-mentioned either out of solidarity or out of fear for personal safety.

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most likely that some of them (above all the SIS, HIS and SNS officials with whom
they cooperated before and/or who were involved in their hiding) are familiar with it.

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5. COLLECTIVE OVERVIEW OF ALL ACTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN (SZUP AND SKP /Crime Police Department/, DATED 27 March 2000).

The SZUP and the MUP's Criminal Police Sector, independently and in mutual co-
operation, and in order to establish relevant information about the crime committed in
Ahmići, its circumstances, its participants and those who tried to cover it up, and in

accordance with law, within operative and criminal investigation, took the following actions:

- through contacts with operative sources, a group of people was identified, for whom there is a reasonable doubt that they were immediate perpetrators and co-ordinators of the crime (Miroslav BRALO, Ivica ANTOLOVIĆ, Paško LJUBIČIĆ, Ante SLIŠKOVIĆ, Tomislav VLAJIĆ, Vlado ĆOSIĆ), organisers and masterminds of the crime committed in Ahmići (Ignac KOŠTROMAN, Dario KORDIĆ, probably Valentin ĆORIĆ and other members of the political leadership of "Herceg-Bosna"); here we are talking about persons for whom there are certain indications that they were familiar with the circumstances of the crime, with the persons who committed it, and organised and ordered it (Ivo LUČIĆ, Ivan BANDIĆ, Ivica PRIMORAC, Miroslav TUĐMAN, etc); as well as a group of people for whom there are indications that they participated in covering up the crime and the persons who committed it (Markica REBIĆ, Stipan UDILJAK, Marin IVANOVIĆ, Ivan LALIĆ etc.) or who would know where the perpetrators are /part of the line redacted/.
- The SZUP initiated the idea of holding a meeting of the Coordination Committee of the Intelligence Community. At that meeting, held on 23 May 2000, it was agreed that all the participants of the crime and those who participated in their hiding would be investigated. A task force will be formed, and it will be engaged with the above-mentioned problem. Co-ordination of the task force will be carried out by the MUP's Criminal Police Department. Other services will submit all available information concerning the Ahmići case to the Department. At the second meeting, held on 31 May 2000, it was concluded that all services should intensify their activities; it was also concluded that a more aggressive approach should be applied towards persons who are involved in this case, and in accordance with this the HIS and SIS should conduct formal interviews with their officials who were involved in the case, and the SZUP with other civilians;

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- In accordance with the above-mentioned conclusions made by the KOOZ /Coordination Committee of the Intelligence Community/, the SZUP's and SKP's officials, together with representatives of the Croatian Intelligence Service and RH Ministry of Defence, participate in the work of the Task force, whose basic task is to co-ordinate all activities in this case and to collect documentation that could be used for the possible initiation of criminal proceedings against the persons responsible. However, the results of the MUP's Criminal Police Department points out that information, documents and materials, as well as some other data that could contribute to the criminal investigation were not collected until now. /Such material is needed/ in order to turn some material or information into a reasonable suspicion that the crime was committed and that a specific person committed the crime in Ahmići or participated in it, or that the person committed some other crime related to the crime, for example, providing a false identity, hiding perpetrators, etc;
- Based on the conclusions brought by the KOOZ, the SZUP's and SKP's officials conducted formal interviews with Ignac KOŠTROMAN, Žarko ŠOKČIĆ, defence counsel Anto NOBILO, Marinko ŽILIĆ and /part of the line redacted/ in co-operation with the SIS Administration, and with the /part of the line redacted/, and based on the permission given by the Head of the HIS, with HIS officials /part of the line redacted/ (11 formal interviews in total, up to now). Analysis of the conversations that the MORH officials conducted with /part of the line redacted/ was also carried out, as well as with the SIS officials (for a certain period of time also with the HIS officials) who participated in the hiding of persons – suspects for the war crime in Ahmići. The above-mentioned conversations resulted in obtaining very useful information about the crime, its circumstances and the persons that participated in it, but not in information that could be used in possible criminal proceedings. We should point out the attempt at conducting formal interviews with MORH officers /part of the line redacted/ that was organised by the SIS Administration with our

English Translation

participation, did not happen because the afore-mentioned officers had refused to be interviewed;

- We went through the MUP's AOP /Data Processing/ in order to establish the residence of the suspects, and based on the collected information we established that a residence on RH territory for only V. ČOSIĆ, while P. LJUBIČIĆ, A. SLIŠKOVIĆ and T. VLAJIĆ are registered in Busovača, BiH;
- Through operative work we collected information on possible residences – that is, hiding-places of the suspects. Places and locations where those persons could be are under constant surveillance. Also, based on the available information, a partial reconstruction of their movement from 1997 to date was carried out. Among other things, information about their stays in the areas of Zagreb, Knin, Primošten, Umag, Karin, Maslenica, etc, was checked or is being checked at the moment;
- Information has been collected about persons who were or are familiar with their hiding-places, that is those who contacted them directly or over the phone since 1997 to date. A formal interview was conducted on 4 August with one of those persons, Žarko ŠOKČIĆ, after the adequate measures and preparations had been made.
- Preparations are underway for conversations with other persons who could have such information at their disposal. (Vendo BOŠNJAK, Marko PRANJIC, Željko IDŽAN, etc);
- An analysis was conducted to establish whether V. ČOSIĆ, P. LJUBIČIĆ and A. SLIŠKOVIĆ were hiding with forged documents made under the names of **Ivan TOMAS** and **Ivan BRĐANOVIĆ**. Although we did not get irrefutable results, we can conclude that Paško LJUBIČIĆ is hiding (or was hiding) under the documents that were issued in name of I. TOMAS. The papers that were issued in name of Ivan BRĐANOVIĆ are being used by Ivan ANDABAK, who is the one-time assistant of Mladen NALETILIĆ aka Tuta, The Hague's indictee;
- On 7 June, we asked the Ministry of Interior for photographs of A. SLIŠKOVIĆ and Tomislav VLAJIĆ, whose passports were issued in

the RH's General Consulate in Mostar. We still have not received a response;

- We sent several requests to the Ministry of Defence for submission of information concerning certain individuals, active or retired MORH and HV officials, for whom there are some indications that they have at their disposal information about the crime committed in Ahmići (since they had been HVO or HR H-B MUP members at the time). There are also indications that those individuals were involved in hiding the suspects for the crime;
- It is established that /part of the line redacted/ resides on the territory of Zadar, a former member of /part of the line redacted/, who in 1997. left /part of the line redacted/ and who has been in the RH since then. /Part of the line redacted/ was transferred at the orders of the SIS, and this was supported by the SZUP. /Part of the line redacted/ knows about the circumstances of -- and persons who committed -- the crime in Ahmići, and BLAŠKIĆ's defence counsel Anto NOBILO was informed about this during the trial of the General BLAŠKIĆ, who after he had contact with him, gave up the idea to go to The Hague as a protected defence witness. A summary of the activities related to the SZUP's role in bringing /part of the line redacted/ to the RH was submitted to the MORH on 01.06.2000;
- Through Interpol for BiH in Sarajevo, the submission of information and documentation concerning the crime committed in Ahmići was requested. The response was that trial record was handed over to the ICTY's Office of the Prosecutor;
- A request for the access to documentation concerning the crime committed in Ahmići and which is probably at The Hague Tribunal, was submitted to the Office for the Cooperation with the ICTY. The response was received concerning the readiness of the ICTY to allow such access in principle;
- It has been established that some officials of the Croatian component /of BiH/ have contacts with persons that are indicted; for example, Ante JELAVIĆ who offered legal help to those persons at a recent meeting in Mostar, asking them to put themselves at the disposal of the BiH

Federation's judicial organs. There are some indications that this refers to the fact that those officials (like Valentin ČOSIĆ /sic./) participated in financing the hiding of the suspects;

- In order to conduct a potential formal interview, we are currently performing a check on Željko STIPIĆ, who was the SIS Assistant of the 66th HVO Regiment at the time and who currently resides in Starigrad. We have some indications that he said the suspects are "somewhere here" and that they "live peacefully".
- An analysis of the HIS document "Massacre in Ahmići" was carried out. This is the document that the HIS together with eight other documents (which represents only a small part of the material which should be at the HIS' disposal), submitted at our request;
- Two detailed analyses were made about all obtained information. The first one was made by the SKP and it gives a summary of the results obtained by the forensic analysis of the case, as well as a chronology of measures that were taken, an evaluation of the current situation and recommendations for further activities. The analysis was sent to the Office for the National Security, Croatian Intelligence Service and Ministry of Defence. The other, which was made by the SZUP and presented a summary of the measures that had been taken, as well as of collected information and an evaluation within the operative analysis, was sent to the RH President and RH Vice-Premier, then to the Minister of Justice and Head of the Office for the Co-operation with the International Tribunal in The Hague;
- In the activities connected to the Ahmići case (and especially in search of the suspects) all police administrations of the RH MUP and SZUP Centers, participated;
- Besides the above-mentioned, MUP members were taking many other measures and actions in order to achieve information necessary for further conduct of operative and forensic analysis, and they co-operated with other state institutions;
- All obtained information has been continuously analyzed and evaluated in order to determine the further direction of engagement on this case.

However, as it was mentioned before, with the applied activities legally relevant facts were not obtained or the corresponding judicial documentation that could be used for filing criminal charges against persons responsible for the crime committed in Ahmići and its cover-up. That is why the necessity of acquiring the relevant documentation that is at The Hague International Tribunal's disposal should be emphasized.

We would like to mention that, aside from the conclusions made regarding the mutual meetings and working agreements, the HIS and MORH SIS never sent any analysis of their already gathered information (while they were responsible for the case); a summary of information concerning the crime was not obtained (as a basis for making the plan for further tactical and other procedures); a systematization of documents related to the crime and that are in their possession was also not obtained. Contrary to the conclusions reached earlier, the documentation of the HIS and SIS related to the crime was not submitted to the MUP (except for the afore-mentioned nine documents), which is -- along with what was mentioned previously -- of great importance for conducting a quality forensic analysis and criminal processing of the perpetrators.

6. PROPOSAL FOR THE PRIMARY DIRECTIONS OF FURTHER ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY CROATIAN STATE BODIES

We think that all the bodies that are responsible for the "Ahmići case" should concentrate on the following in their further work:

1. Clarification of all disputable or unexplained circumstances of the crime, specifically:
 - a) Obtaining the results of witnesses, verified and other documents and forensic evaluation at the disposal of the International Tribunal in The Hague and Interpol;
 - b) Detailed definition of the military formations that were active in that area; also, their actual commanders; then, the persons who coordinated the action and who directed units in the field, who were issuing the orders or who tolerated the commission of war crimes;
 - c) Detailed definition of all circumstances related to the meeting, or possibly meetings (if there were in fact two meetings-- one which was

strictly military and one that was organized by so-called political line), that were held on the eve of the action. It is necessary to investigate the circumstances, participants and viewpoints from the second meeting. According to available information, the decision to commit the crime was made at that meeting.

- d) Collecting information concerning the possible existence of "two authorities" in that area, or in other words, two lines of command, one of which ("political") allegedly held supremacy and could decisively influence the conduct of military operations, also including the action in Ahmići and what happened afterwards.

2. Identification of all persons who tried first to hide the crime and then later the perpetrators of the crime as well; this also refers to persons who ordered, organised and/or financed the hiding of perpetrators from among the RH and "Herceg-Bosna" government and also from their security and intelligence apparatus;

- a) In this context, with prior preparation and with the participation of MUP employees, the urgent undertaking of formal interviews with individuals (in the first place with S. UDILJAK and M. IVANOVIĆ, the SIS officials that were directly responsible for hiding the suspects in the period between 1996 and 2000) who have been confirmed as having participated in such actions;
- b) For the same reason, conducting of formal interviews with the then-leaders of the RH intelligence community (Ivan BRZOVIĆ, Miroslav TUĐMAN, Markica REBIĆ, Ante GUGIĆ, Žarko PEŠA, Vlado GALIĆ, etc);

3. Intensification of the activities related to finding the hiding places of the suspected direct perpetrators, and in that context:

- a) Urgent conducting of formal interviews with all persons for whom there are indications that they know about places where the suspects had been hiding, as well as sending the request to the MORH to do the same thing with individuals who were on its active duty list;

- b) Analysis of all available information, documents and statements that could help finding the suspects in any way (analysis of contacts, communications and movements of their friends and persons who could have offered them shelter, observation of catering facilities, hometown clubs and other locations where they had already been seen or where they could be seen, as well as houses and places where they had been hiding before).
- 4. Defining the influence of the "tactics" of defence counsels, "co-ordinators" for the witnesses and other representatives of The Hague's indictees, in possibly misdirecting the investigation, as well as the possible hiding of the true perpetrators because of their personal interests, the interests of their clients, or in order to protect their patrons in the political or military /leadership/ circles in the RH and former "Herceg-Bosna".
- 5. Defining, in so far as it is objectively possible, the circumstances under which in April of this year texts were published in media regarding the hiding of the suspects and the criminal analysis of them. Because, /after this/ they immediately left their previous hiding places, and this *de facto* made impossible to locate them and to arrest them;
- 6. Intensification of contacts with the HIS and MORH, as well as the expedition of the response to the requests that have already been sent. Those requests are for the submission of information and documentation that is essential for further criminal analysis and possible proceedings;
- 7. Selection of individuals who could be witnesses in criminal proceedings which would be conducted against the organizers and those who were covering up the fact that the crime had been committed. We think that some of the persons that have already been indicted could in that case -- and with appropriate conditions -- be made to co-operate with the judicial authorities.